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ABSTRACT
Government mandated drug-pricing policies are an understudied—but potentially
significant—factor in the price of drugs. The 340B program is one of the more controversial
government-mandated prescription drug discount programs. Proponents argue that the program
helps health care systems cover the cost of care they provide for low-income patients. Critics argue
that the program unfairly benefits certain health care systems by assuring them lower drug prices,
drives consolidation and reduces competition in the health care market, and drives up the cost of
drugs. Despite this last claim, there is very little evidence that the 340B program actually impacts
post-launch drug prices (i.e., the price of drugs once they are on the market).
This project uses regression analysis to explore how growth in the 340B program—
specifically, growth in 340B hospitals that have 340B status because they serve a large number of
low-income patients—impacts the cost of drugs administered in the outpatient setting (physicianadministered drugs). The project’s findings reveal that growth in this subset of 340B hospitals
(DSH-340B sites) between 2008 and 2017 is associated with an increase in the price of physicianadministered drugs that were either on patent or had not been off-patent for more than four time
periods (i.e., 24 months). These findings serve as evidence that should be used to inform policy
decisions regarding the future of the 340B program.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The US has some of the highest prescription drug prices in the world (Langreth et al., 2015).
For example, 12 of the 13 drugs approved for cancer in 2012 cost more than $100,000 per year
(Light and Kantarjian, 2013), and a month supply of Gilenya, a drug for multiple sclerosis, costs
more than $5,400. These high prices have unintended consequences such as 1) increasing the taxes
individuals pay to fund Medicare, 2) increasing the cost of insurance premiums, and 3) negatively
impacting health outcomes.1
A number of factors have been identified as contributors to high and rising drug costs
including research and development, marketing and advertising,2 exclusivity rights in the form of
patents, and consumer price insensitivity due to third party (i.e., health insurer) payment for drugs.
Government mandated drug-pricing policies are a less well-studied—but potentially significant—
factor in the price of drugs.
This project explores how the 340B program, a government-mandated prescription drug
discount program, affects the post-launch price of drugs administered in the outpatient clinic
setting (physician-administered drugs). My hypothesis is that growth in a subset of 340B
organizations—namely, health care facilities that have 340B status because they are classified as

A 2013 study by Zafar et al. found that roughly 20% of insured cancer patients failed to adhere to medication
instructions because of the high out-of-pocket costs they would have incurred.
2 In 1998 the pharmaceutical industry spent $12.7 billion on various marketing schemes such as advertisements in
medical journals, consumer ads, and free-samples securing it the 34th place in marketing expenditures (Pew, 2013). By
2012, advertising costs had increased to $28 billion, 10 percent of the overall amount spent on prescription drugs that
year (Pew, 2013). In 2013, the world’s ten largest pharmaceutical companies spent more on marketing and advertising
than R&D (Anderson, 2014).
1

1

disproportionate share hospital sites (DSH)3—has caused the price of physician-administered
drugs to rise. The aim of the project is to produce evidence that can be used to inform policy
decisions regarding the future of the 340B program.
The paper proceeds as follows. I start by explaining the 340B program and how it can
impact drug prices (chapter 2). I then situate my project within the current debate about the impact
of the 340B program on health care spending (chapter 3). Next, I discuss the data with which I will
be working (chapter 4). I then report the results of several descriptive and statistical analyses of the
data (chapter 5). I conclude by discussing the relevance of these findings to the debate about how
the 340B program impacts consumers and healthcare spending (chapter 6). The conclusion also
reviews several limitations of the project and lays out potential next steps.

Disproportionate Share Hospitals are hospitals that serve a disproportionate number of low-income patients (i.e.,
11.75% of their patient population are low-income).
3
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CHAPTER 2
THE 340B PROGRAM

The 340B program was created by the US government in 1992 as a way to ensure that
“covered entities” (i.e., certain types of hospitals) could provide care for uninsured and
underinsured patients (MedPAC, 2015).4 Covered entities are organizations that provide significant
amounts of care to poor individuals (e.g., disproportionate share hospitals—DSHs) or organizations
that meet a specific social need (e.g., rural referral centers, children’s hospitals, critical access
hospitals, etc.). The program requires drug manufacturers to give covered entities deep discounts
on drugs in order for the drugs to be included on the Medicaid formulary. The discounted price
allows the covered entities to realize greater profit margins on these drugs because their purchase
prices are substantially lower than the prices they are reimbursed by both public and private
payers. Covered entities are supposed to use the enhanced profit margin to help cover the cost of
care they provide to their low-income, uninsured/underinsured patient populations. To fully
appreciate how the 340B program benefits covered entities, it is important to understand how
Medicare and commercial insurance companies pay for drugs.

Drug Payment
There are two basic types of drugs—self-administered and physician-administered—and
two ways that Medicare and other insurers pay for them—the medical benefit and the pharmacy
benefit.
At present, covered entities include public or non-profit disproportionate share hospitals, critical access hospitals,
children’s hospitals, freestanding cancer hospitals, rural referral centers, and sole community hospitals.
4
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Table 1: Two Types of Drugs
Examples
Medicare Coverage
Commercial Payer
Coverage (including
Medicare Advantage)

Self-Administered Drugs
Anti-depressants, antibiotics, oral
anti-cancer drugs, etc.
Medicare Part D
Pharmacy benefit

Physician-Administered Drugs
Infused drugs (e.g., chemotherapy),
certain injections, blood transfusions, etc.
Medicare Part B
Medical benefit

Most small molecule drugs that are self-administered and prescribed in the outpatient
setting are covered by a pharmacy benefit. A pharmacy benefit is an insurance plan that covers
outpatient prescription drug costs. The pharmacy benefit works as follows: The clinician prescribes
the drug, the patient gets the prescription filled at a pharmacy, and the pharmacy benefit pays the
pharmacy for the drug. The pharmacy purchases the drugs they sell from either drug
manufacturers or wholesalers and are able to make a profit by charging payers a price above the
acquisition cost (see figure 1). Many commercial insurers bundle the pharmacy benefit into
patients’ basic insurance plans though it is often administered through a pharmacy benefit manager
(PBM) such as ExpressScripts or CVS Health. Medicare patients must purchase part D coverage in
order to have a pharmacy benefit and the benefit they purchase is usually one that is administered
by a PBM.

Figure 1. Payment for Self-Administered Drugs Through the Pharmacy Benefit. The provider
prescribes the patient a drug and the patient goes to a pharmacy to get the prescription filled. The
pharmacy fills the prescription with a drug they have purchased from the drug manufacturer or a

4

wholesaler. The pharmacy then bills the patient’s insurer through the patient’s pharmacy benefit
manager. The insurer pays the pharmacy benefit manager to conduct all of the negotiating and
payment processes for the drug.
Large molecule drugs such as biologics as well as other drugs that are administered in the
outpatient clinic setting are generally paid for by a patient’s medical benefit.5 For most privately
insured patients, the medical benefit pays for inpatient and outpatient medical services including
the medical equipment and drugs administered in these settings. Medicare pays for services
provided and drugs administered in the inpatient setting through their part A benefit, and they pay
for services provided and drugs administered in the outpatient setting (i.e., physician-administered
drugs) through their part B benefit. The medical benefit works as follows: The clinician provides a
service or administers a drug, they bill the insurer for the service or administered drug, and the
insurer pays the clinician for the rendered service or administered drug. When it comes to
physician-administered drugs, this practice is referred to as the “buy-and-bill” method (see figure
2) because the provider buys the drug from the manufacturer or wholesaler, administers it to the
patient, and then bills the patient’s payer for the drug.

Figure 2. The Buy-and-Bill Method. The provider purchases the drug from the drug manufacturer or
wholesaler. The provider then administers the drug to a patient and bills the patient’s insurer (i.e.,
the public or private payer) for the cost of administering the drug and the cost of the drug. Because
5

Most physician-administered drugs are infused or injected.

5

payers do not know the amount providers pay for these drugs, they will often negotiate with the
provider to reimburse them at a fixed percentage of the average sales price of the drug.
The 340B Benefit
Providers with 340B status benefit because they are guaranteed a reduced price when
acquiring 340B eligible drugs. A 2015 MedPAC report, for instance, found that the minimum
discount covered entities receive is 22.5% of the drug’s average sale price (ASP). Thus, a drug that
has an average sales price of $1,000 would only cost a 340B program $775 to acquire.
Because providers do not sell self-administered drugs directly to patients (and do not
receive payment for these drugs from the insurer), they must pursue another route to realize the
benefit of the price reduction on these drugs. The solution is that they contract with a pharmacy.
There are several ways that contract pharmacies can operate. The following is a basic model: the
provider purchases the drugs at the reduced 340B price from the manufacturer or wholesaler and
has them delivered to the contract pharmacy. After the pharmacy sells the drug to the patient and is
paid by the insurer, the pharmacy reimburses the provider the retail sale price of the drug minus an
order management fee that the pharmacy keeps.
Providers with 340B benefit from physician-administered drugs in a slightly different, but
more straight forward, manner. As already mentioned, for physician-administered drugs, the
provider engages in the buy-and-bill process—i.e., the provider purchases the drug from either the
manufacturer or a distributor, and then, after administering the drug to the patient, the provider
bills the patient’s insurer, who pays for the drug. Providers with 340B benefit because they get the
physician-administered drugs at a lower price, but insurers reimburse them at the normal, fixed
rate. For example, assuming the minimum discount covered entities receive is 22.5% of the drug’s
average sale price (ASP), a provider with 340B status who is reimbursed for physicianadministered drugs at ASP + 6%, the amount Medicare generally reimburses at, will have a profit
margin of at least 28.5% on these drugs.

6

CHAPTER 3
SITUATING THE CURRENT PROJECT

In recent years, there has been increasing scrutiny of the 340B program. While there is
some evidence that the 340B program improves care for some low-income patient populations
(Castellon et al., 2014), opponents and skeptics argue that it introduces incentives that conflict with
providing optimal patient care at the lowest cost. And there is some evidence that it has, in fact,
contributed to the rise in overall health care spending and inappropriate drug use.
A 2015 Government Accountability Office (GAO) study, for instance, found that spending at
340B hospitals (i.e., hospitals that receive 340B pricing) was substantially higher and that these
hospitals prescribe “more drugs or more expensive drugs” than non-340B hospitals. Importantly,
the GAO notes that the difference in spending was not explained by differences in patients’ health—
i.e., it was not because 340B hospitals were treating sicker patients.6 The study concluded that the
340B program incentivizes greater drug use and/or the use of more expensive drugs. Another
study by Conti and Bach (2014) found that 340B organizations registered after 2004 were more
likely to be located in wealthier communities with better payer mixes (i.e., higher rates of privately
insured individuals) than those registered prior to 2004, a finding that is seemingly inconsistent
with the program’s original intent to help impoverished patients. Finally, research sponsored by the
Community Oncology Alliance and the Berkeley Research Group used several data sets including
CMS Medicare Outpatient Claims data and data on 340B sales from several drug manufacturers to
identify the 340B program as a major driver of consolidation in the health care provider market,
The study did not look at the connection between spending and health outcomes so it is possible that the increase in
spending led to better health outcomes.
6
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especially hospital acquisition of private oncology practices (Vandervelde, 2014).7 Many believe
that increased consolidation causes health care costs to rise because care provided in the hospital
setting is more expensive than that provided in private practices (Gaynor and Town, 2012).
Other critics of the program argue it plays a role in driving up drug prices. The idea behind
this line of criticism is that drug manufacturers simply shift the cost of the 340B program by
increasing the price they charge for drugs. Because the 340B program has been rapidly growing,
these skeptics argue that the impact of the program on drug prices is also rapidly increasing.
Given the interest in drug prices and the intuitive reasoning for how growth in the 340B
program could impact prices, it is surprising that relatively little work has been done in this area. It
is even more surprising given that previous research showed that government mandated drug
discount programs likely lead to higher drug prices. For example, a 1996 study by the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) found that drug manufacturers increased the best price they
offered purchasers by almost 17% to offset a drug rebate they were required to provide state
Medicaid programs. The one paper that discusses the impact of the 340B program on drug prices
did not conduct an analysis to identify the program’s impact on post-launch drug prices. Rather,
Howard et al. (2015) used least squares regression to show that a 10% annual increase in the
launch price of anti-cancer drugs is not attributable to common drug characteristics, and they
suggested that the 340B program may be partially responsible for the increase as it may encourage
drug manufacturers to raise launch prices to help cover revenue losses they expect to incur from
the 340B discounts.8
As Howard et al. (2015) note, drug manufacturers may set launch prices high so they can
avoid having to raise post-launch prices to offset the impact of the 340B program. This is likely a
A 2017 paper by Alpert et al. looking at the impact of 340B expansion under the ACA found that ACA-expansion 340B
entities—i.e., entities that got 340B status due to the ACA expansion—explains very little of the recent consolidation in
the oncology space. This finding, however, fails to negate the earlier finding from the Community Oncology Alliance and
Berkeley Research Group because DSH 340B entities (i.e., entities that have 340B status because they serve a significant
number of low-income patients) were not significantly impacted by the ACA expansion, and these are the 340B entities
that are most likely to provide cancer care and, therefore, the most likely to purchase private oncology practices.
8 Howard et al. 2015 used the ASP Drug Pricing Files to identify launch prices.
7

8

strategic decision meant to avoid negative publicity. After all, large price increases post-launch are
often seen as attempts to price-gouge patients and tend to be received negatively in the press. As an
example, one need only consider the publicity Martin Shrkeli and Turing Pharmaceuticals received
after their massive price hike (over 5,000%) on Daraprim, a drug used to treat AIDs-related and
AIDs-unrelated toxoplasmosis. But not all post-launch price increases are large enough to trigger a
negative publicity campaign. Indeed, the price increases manufacturers institute to recoup revenue
lost through the 340B program may be quite small. Over time, however, these small increases add
up and can have a significant impact on consumers.
To my knowledge, no research to date has looked at how the 340B program affects postlaunch drug prices. Thus, there is a gap in the knowledge necessary to understand how the 340B
program impacts consumers and the health care system. This project aims to fill that gap by
analyzing how growth in a subset of 340B entities—namely, DSH-340B sites—affects the postlaunch price of physician-administered drugs.

9

CHAPTER 4
DATA DESCRIPTION

In this chapter, I discuss the data sources I use to construct the panel data set to test my
hypothesis that growth in the number of DSH-340B sites causes the price of physician-administered
drugs to rise. The panel consists of 9.5 years of pricing data on 35 drugs. Drug price serves as the
dependent variable, the number of DSH-340B sites as the independent variable of interest, and a
slew of other variables as controls.

Physician-Administered Drugs
The sample consists of 35 physician-administered drugs (see table 2). The sample consists
entirely of this type of drug because there is available price data (CMS’s ASP Drug Pricing Files,
discussed below) that has been used in previous drug price research. This data exists because CMS
requires all drug manufacturers that wish to be listed on the Medicaid formulary to submit
quarterly average sales prices (ASP) for their physician-administered drugs. Medicare uses this
data to set the rate that they will reimburse providers, and they make the data publicly available to
provide transparency to beneficiaries, providers, and the public.
The sample does not include any self-administered drugs because data on pricing for this
class of drugs is simply too challenging to locate or too costly to acquire. Since Medicare doesn’t
directly reimburse pharmacies for self-administered outpatient drugs (the pharmacy benefit
manager administering the part D plan does that), they don’t require drug manufacturers to submit
data on the average sales prices of these drugs. And, the pharmacies that purchase drugs and then

10

Table 2. Physician-Administered Drugs in Entire Sample and Price Changes
Drug Name

Primary
Disease

Adalimumab

Humira

Arthritis

Afilbercept (optical)

Eylea

ziv-Afilbercept
Basiliximab

Overall
Price
Change9

Periods

171%

19

Ocular

0%

6

Zaltrap

Cancer

-14%

7

Simulect

Transplant

133%

19

Bevacizumab

Avastin

Cancer

19%

19

Bortezomib

Velcade

Cancer

38%

19

Cabazitaxel

Jevtana

Cancer

11%

11

Capecitabine oral

Xeloda

Cancer

-45%

15

Carboplatin

Paraplatin

Cancer

-57%

19

Certolizumab pegol

Cimzia

Crohns

105%

15

Cetuximab

Erbitux

Cancer

19%

19

Cisplatin

Platinol

Cancer

-19%

19

Docetaxel

Taxotere

Cancer

-76%

19

Eculizumab

Soliris

Bd

34%

17

Everolimus oral

Afinitor

Cancer

33%

11

Filgrastim G-CSF

Neupogen

Cancer

48%

16

Filgrastim tbo

Granix

Cancer

-12%

6

Golimumab

Simponi

Arthritis

0%

6

Infliximab

Remicade

Arthritis

57%

19

Ipilumimab

Yervoy

Cancer

11%

11

Methotrexate

Trexall

Arthritis

0%

19

Necitumumab

Portrazza

Cancer

.

1

Nivolumab

Opvido

Cancer

3%

3

Paclitaxel inj

Taxol

Cancer

-57%

19

Panitumumab

Vectibix

Cancer

38%

Pefgfilgrastim

Neulasta

Cancer

75%

19
19 (missing
time pd 4)

Pembrolizumab

Keytruda

Cancer

3%

3

Pemetrexed
Pentostatin

Nipent

Cancer

0%

19
19 (missing
time pd 4 &
6)

Ramucirumab

Cyramza

Cancer

3%

3

Alimta

Cancer

38%

Ranibizumab

Lucentis

Ocular

0%

19

Rituximab

Rituxan

Cancer

57%

19

Sipuleucel-T

Provenge

Cancer

11%

11

Trastuzumab

Herceptin

Cancer

57%

19

Topotecan (oral)

9

Brand Name

Hycamtin

Cancer

14%

Annual
Price
Change
18%

Expired pd 18

0%

Yes

-4%

Yes

14%

Yes

2%

Yes

4%

Expired pd 19

2%

Expired pd 17

6%

Expired pd 12

-6%

No

14%

Yes

2%

Expired pd 17

-2%

No

-8%

Expired pd 5

4%

Yes

6%

Yes

6%

Expired pd 12

-4%

Yes

0%

Yes

6%

Yes

2%

Yes

0%

No

.

Yes

2%

Yes

-6%

No

4%

Yes

7.9%

Expired pd 16

2%

Yes

4%

Yes

0%

No

2%

Yes

0%

Yes

6%

Expired pd 18

2%

Yes

6%

Yes

4%

No (not available until
pd 8 when it went off
patent)

7

The overall and annual price changes noted here are not adjusted to account for inflation.
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Patent Protection

are reimbursed by pharmacy benefit managers on behalf of Medicare and commercial insurers
rarely share their acquisition costs as this is considered a confidential part of their pricing
contracts. Thus, there is no publicly available data on the pricing of self-administered drugs like
there is for physician-administered drugs.
It is worth noting that many of the drugs in the sample are very costly—well over $1,000
per treatment. The fact that the sample is largely comprised of high-cost drugs could bias the
project’s findings. For instance, it could be that the findings only apply to high-cost physicianadministered drugs. I discuss this point in the conclusion when I review limitations of the project.

ASP Drug Pricing Files
The physician-administered drug prices (i.e., drug prices) are from the CMS ASP (average
sales price) Drug Pricing Files. These files, which are updated every three months, provide the ASP
of all physician-administered drugs for which Medicare reimburses providers.10 As already noted,
because the acquisition cost of these drugs varies by purchaser and is kept confidential, the
Medicare ASP is the best indicator of the drugs’ prices.

DSH-340B Sites
The explanatory variable of interest is the subset of 340B covered entity sites that have that
status because they are disproportionate share hospitals or outpatient departments of a
disproportionate share hospital (i.e., DSH-340B sites).11 To identify the number of DSH-340B sites
for each year, I analyzed the registry of 340B covered entities maintained by Health Resources and
Services Administration (HRSA). The registry’s annual count is used as the site count for the first

The ASP for each drug is a per-unit price, and different drugs are priced at different units. For example, a unit of Avastin
is 10mg and it is dosed at 10mg/kg, while a unit of Humira is 20mg and it is dosed at 40mg for adults. Thus, in 2017, a
dose of Humira for an adult would cost $1,068.52 and a dose of Avastin would cost $5,449.93.
11 A single 340B covered entity can have multiple covered entity sites. For instance, Hospital X is a covered entity because
it has 340B status and the five hospital outpatient departments located at different addresses that are part of the Hospital
X system are covered entity sites, meaning that the drugs they prescribe are eligible for 340B pricing.
10
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half of the year (January-June). To determine the number of sites for the second half of the year
(July-December), I subtracted the current year’s count from the following year’s count, divided this
by 2 and then added this to the current year’s count.12 Figure 3 illustrates the number of DSH-340B
sites for the period January 1, 2008- January 1, 2017.

Figure 3. 10-Year Growth in DSH-340B Sites (January 1, 2008 to January 1, 2017)
The analysis focuses on DSH-340B sites because growth among this group is the most likely
to impact the price of physician-administered drugs. This is because DSH-340B sites are the type of
340B entity that provides significant amounts of physician-administered drug services—e.g.,
infusions, transfusions, injections.
It is worth pointing out that the current analysis does not include freestanding cancer
hospitals with 340B status. This may seem odd given that freestanding cancer hospitals provide a
substantial number of physician-administered drugs to patients. However, given that there is only
Formula: [{number of DSH-340B sites (year t+1) - number of DSH-340B sites (year t)}/2] + number of DSH-340B sites
(time period t)= number of DSH-340B sites (July-December time period).
12
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one freestanding cancer hospital—City of Hope—with 340B status, the actual number of physicianadministered drugs provided by 340B freestanding cancer hospitals is likely minimal. Leaving them
out is unlikely to bias the project’s findings.

Time Periods
The data set covers 19 time periods. Each time period covers six months from January 1,
2008 to January 1, 2017. The six-month periods run from January to June (e.g., period 1) and July to
December (e.g., period 2). The six-month blocks coincide with the Medicare pricing report for the
first quarter (prices for January through March) and the third quarter of the year (prices for July
through September). Some drugs do not have 19 periods of data as they were either brought to
market or taken off market between January 1, 2008 and January 1, 2017.
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CHAPTER 5
RESULTS

The following chapter reviews the results of several analyses. The first section provides
descriptive analysis of DSH-340B sites and the physician-administered drugs in the sample. The
second section reports results from the statistical analysis of the data.

Descriptive Analysis
DSH-340B Sites
A review of the data reveals that the number of DSH-340B sites grew by 744% over the 9.5
year period (see figure 3). Table 3 offers year over year growth. While the years 2011 and 2012
experienced the greatest percentage growth, the number of DSH-340B sites increased by at least
2,000 annually between 2011 and 2017. Growth is primarily due to hospitals acquiring private
practices throughout the period, and not to a larger number of hospitals receiving DSH-340B status
(Vandervelde , 2014).
It’s important to note that the period 2011-2015 was a time of increased consolidation
across health care. Hospitals with 340B status and those without sought to acquire private
practices or other hospitals to gain economics of scale, increase negotiating power with commercial
payers, and secure referrals (Ginsburg, 2016; Alpert et al., 2017). This increase in consolidation was
partially a response to commercial payers’ attempts to gain greater negotiating power through
mergers and acquisitions and rein in costs by decreasing network size (i.e., the number of health
care providers in the insurer’s network). As noted earlier, there is some evidence that hospitals
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with 340B status were more likely to acquire private practices than those without 340B status
during this period (Avalere Health LLC, 2016).

Table 3. Percent Change in number of DSH-340B Sites (January 1, 2008 to January 1, 2017)
20082009
15%

20092010
14%

20102011
9%

20112012
66%

20122013
49%

20132014
38%

20142015
28%

20152016
23%

20162017
11%

Drug Prices
A review of the period price for each drug from January 2008 to January 2017 reveals
extensive variation. Table 3 reports the percent price change for each drug in the sample. Not all
drugs were available for the entire 19 time periods as some came to market during this time while
others went off market. Commonly-used, patent-protected drugs like Adalimumab (mean price
$1,068.52) and Bevacizumab (mean price $5,449.93) increased substantially over the 9.5 year

period.13 As figures 4 and 5 illustrate, prices shot up around 2012, the tenth time period. This
coincides with a period of increased growth in the number of DSH-340B sites (see figure 3 above).
In general, the price of drugs that were on-patent as of 2008 increased or stayed steady.

Figure 4. Average Sales Price for Adalimumab
(January 1, 2008-January 1, 2017)

Figure 5. Average Sales Price for Bevacizumab
(January 1, 2008-January 1, 2017)

Mean price formula: (drug_price pd1 + drug_price_pd2 +… drug_price_pdk)/K adjusted to dosage required for an 80kg
adult.
13
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Relatively new drugs, such as Nivolumab (mean price $6,291.72) and Pembrolizumab
(mean price $9,383.50), showed very little price fluctuation (see table 3). It is possible that the
launch prices of these drugs were set with the impact of 340B in mind and, therefore, there has
been less need to increase the post-launch prices of these drugs. This explanation is consistent with
the Howard et al. (2015) hypothesis regarding the impact of 340B on drug launch prices. It is also
possible that these drugs are so new that the manufacturers have yet to increase the prices.
Carboplatin and Methotrexate, two older drugs whose patents expired prior to 2008,
experienced substantial price decreases over the 9.5 year period. Figure 6 illustrates price changes
for Carboplatin (mean price $74.30), which was off-patent for the entire 9.5 year period.
Interestingly, the greatest price change for this drug occurred prior to the explosion of growth in
DSH-340B sites. The initial drop followed by relative stability could be due to entry of generic
drugs. Methotrexate (mean price $4.76), a drug that has been available since the 1940s
experienced a sharp decline during the first ten time periods and then rebounded, only to drop
again (figure 7).

Figure 6: Average Sales Price for Carboplatin
(January 1, 2008-January 1, 2017)

Figure 7: Average Sales Price for Methotrexate
(January 1, 2008-January 1, 2017)

Figure 8 illustrates how patent-expiration can affect a drug’s price. Capecitabine oral (mean
price $127.80) went off patent around the 12th time period. Its price rose steadily until the 14th
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period, and then it entered a steady decline. Finally, the price of Filgrastim (mean price $352) rose
until the 13th time period where it plateaued (figure 9).14 The plateau coincides with the drug’s
patent expiration (12th time period).

Figure 8: Average Sales Price for Capecitabine
(January 1, 2008-January 1, 2017)

Figure 9: Average Sales Price for Filgrastim
(January 1, 2008-January 1, 2017)

Statistical Analysis
Certain subsets of drugs are more likely to be impacted by growth in the 340B program, so
the analysis was run on five different groups (see table 4). The first group (group A) included all
drugs in the sample, and addresses the question of whether DSH-340B expansion impacts all drugs,
regardless of whether they are patent-protected or not.
Drugs that are off-patent and have generic substitutes may respond differently to growth in
the number of DSH-340B sites, so the analysis was run on two other groups (group B and group C)
that excluded off-patent drugs. Group B only excluded drugs that were off-patent for the entire 9.5
year period.
The third group (group C) excluded drugs that were off-patent for more than four time
periods (24 months). Regression analysis looking at a large number of lags on patent-expiration
14

ASP data for Filgrastim was not available for time periods 17, 18, and 19.
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indicated that the prices for drugs that went-off patent during the 9.5 year period did not usually
start to decrease until the fifth time period after patent expiration. The delay in price reduction
associated with patent expiration is probably due to the time lag between patent expiration and
generic entry (i.e., it often takes several months to years for generics to get approval and enter the
market) and the time lag needed to obtain pricing data that reflects generic entry (CMS sets ASP on
the previous quarter’s sales data, so the impact of generics on ASP will not be reflected
immediately). The drugs in group C provide insight into how growth in the number of DSH-340B
sites impacts drugs that do not have generic substitutes or whose prices have not yet been
impacted by generics in the market.
The fourth group (group D) includes drugs that were top 20 bestsellers in 2016. All of these
drugs were patent-protected in 2008 if they were on the market. Several of the drugs in this sample
did not come to market until after 2008. This group is important because these drugs contribute
such a large amount to their manufacturers’ revenue streams. Given their contribution,
manufacturers may be more inclined to raise the prices of these drugs than the prices of drugs that
make a smaller revenue contribution to recover money lost through the 340B program.
Accordingly, growth in the number of DSH-340B sites should have a more significant impact on this
group—both practically and statistically—than it does on groups A, B, or C.
The fifth and final group consists of all drugs that were off-patent for more than four
periods. This group is used to provide insight into how growth in the number of DSH-340B sites
impacts the price of drugs that aren’t patent-protected and have generic substitutes in the market.15

The group only includes drugs off-patent for more than four periods to ensure generics have been on the market long
enough to impact price.
15
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Table 4. Drugs Included in Each Group
Group A
Entire Sample

Group B
Entire Sample
Excluding Drugs Off
Patent Before 2008

Group C
Entire Sample
Excluding Drugs Off
Patent More Than 4
Periods

Group D
Blockbuster
Drugs

Adalimumab

Adalimumab

Adalimumab

Adalimumab

Afilbercept (optical)

Afilbercept (optical)

Afilbercept (optical)

Afilbercept
(optical)

ziv-Afilbercept

ziv-Afilbercept

ziv-Afilbercept

Basiliximab

Basiliximab

Basiliximab

Bevacizumab

Bevacizumab

Bevacizumab

Bortezomib

Bortezomib

Bortezomib

Cabazitaxel

Cabazitaxel

Cabazitaxel

Capecitabine oral

Capecitabine oral

Group E
Drugs Off Patent
More Than 4
Periods

Bevacizumab

Capecitabine oral

Carboplatin

Carboplatin

Certolizumab pegol

Certolizumab pegol

Certolizumab pegol

Cetuximab

Cetuximab

Cetuximab

Cisplatin

Cisplatin

Docetaxel

Docetaxel

Docetaxel

Eculizumab

Eculizumab

Eculizumab
Everolimus oral

Everolimus oral

Everolimus oral

Filgrastim G-CSF

Filgrastim G-CSF

Filgrastim G-CSF

Filgrastim G-CSF

Filgrastim tbo

Filgrastim tbo

Filgrastim tbo

Filgrastim tbo

Golimumab

Golimumab

Golimumab

Infliximab

Infliximab

Infliximab

Ipilumimab

Ipilumimab

Ipilumimab

Infliximab

Methotrexate

Methotrexate

Necitumumab

Necitumumab

Necitumumab

Nivolumab

Nivolumab

Nivolumab

Paclitaxel inj

Paclitaxel inj

Panitumumab

Panitumumab

Panitumumab

Pefgfilgrastim

Pefgfilgrastim

Pefgfilgrastim

Pembrolizumab

Pembrolizumab

Pembrolizumab

Pemetrexed

Pemetrexed

Pemetrexed

Pefgfilgrastim

Pentostatin

Pentostatin

Ramucirumab

Ramucirumab

Ramucirumab

Ranibizumab

Ranibizumab

Ranibizumab

Rituximab

Rituximab

Rituximab

Sipuleucel-T

Sipuleucel-T

Sipuleucel-T

Trastuzumab

Trastuzumab

Trastuzumab

Topotecan (oral)

Rituximab

Trastuzumab
Topotecan (oral)
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The analysis of the panel data set was conducted using a random-effects generalized least
squares model (see model specification below). The model uses log transformations of both real
drug prices,16 the dependent variable, and number of DSH-340B sites, the independent variable of
interest. The model includes controls for:
1. Patent expiration and two lags of patent expiration because off-patent drugs may respond
differently to changes in the number of DSH-340B sites than patent-protected drugs
2. Two lags of a dummy variable for the time period that the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (PPACA) was passed because this program expanded the scope of the 340B
program and may have induced manufacturers to raise prices more aggressively
3. A dummy variable for periods when Democrats controlled both the house and the
presidency because manufacturers may preemptively raise drug prices to counteract costshifting and drug cost-containment policies they assume Democrats will pursue when they
have control
4. The unemployment rate for each period because changes in unemployment translate to
changes in the size of the population of low-income individuals and this can impact the
number of hospitals eligible for DSH-340B status

GLS Random Effects Model

Υlog_of_real_drug_price = βlog_of_DSH_340B_entities +βpatent_expiration_period + βlag_1_of_patent_expiration_period +
βlag_2_of_patent_expiration_period + βlag_1_of_PPACA + βlag_2_of_PPACA + βunemployment + βdemocratic_control+ ε

The random effects model was chosen after running the hausman test and finding that the
null hypothesis—that individual level effects are appropriately captured by the random effects
model—could not be rejected (prob >chi2 = 0.2882).
16

The real price of drugs was obtained using CPI. All prices were indexed to January 2008.
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Table 5 reports the results from the GLS random effects model.17 The most relevant finding
is that the number of DSH-340B sites is significant for groups C and D. For group C, a 1% change in
the number of DSH-340B sites is associated with a 0.11% change in drug price. While this seems
modest, it actually translates into a fairly substantial price increase given that growth in sites
ranged between 66% and 11% annually over the 9.5 year period. For example, the 33% growth that
occurred in the first half of 2011 translates into a 3.6% increase in drug price for this period. See
table 6 for the actual dollar amount of the increase for select drugs.
For group D, a 1% change in the number of DSH-340B sites is associated with a 0.16%
change in drug price (5.3% price increase given a 33% increase in the number of DSH-340B sites).
This suggests that the impact of DSH-340B growth is slightly greater on group D drugs (blockbuster
drugs) than group C drugs. This finding seems reasonable given that these drugs contribute so
much revenue and manufacturers are probably looking to protect these drug prices more
aggresively.
Growth in 340B entities is negatively associated with the price of drugs in group E (i.e.,
drugs off-patent for more than four periods). A 1% increase in the number of DSH-340B sites is
associated with a 0.36% decrease in drug price (11.9% price decrease given a 33% increase in the
number of DSH-340B sites). Despite this finding, it is unlikely that growth in the number of DSH340B sites is actually causing the price drop for group E drugs. The more likely explanation is that
expanded health insurance coverage and the aging of the population which is leading to increased
disease incidence18 is increasing demand for these drugs. And, because there are relatively few

The analysis was run using several variants of this model to test the significance of other potential control variables.
The first model (appendix A) replaced the log of DSH-340B sites with the first lag of this variable because it is possible
that growth in the number of DSH-340B sites has a delayed affect on drug prices. The model was run to explore whether
the lag of the independent variable of interest (number of DSH-340B sites) has a greater impact on drug prices than the
present period independent variable. The second model included dummies for time period 3 through time period 19
(Appendix B). The third model added a time trend variable to the base model (Appendix C). The fourth model added a lag
of the dependent variable to construct a time series model (Appendix D). The results from these models are included as
appendices.
18 Expanded health insurance coverage is largely due to passage and implementation of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (PPACA). Increasing cancer incidence is likely the primary driver here given that most drugs in the
sample are anti-cancer drugs.
17
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barriers to market entry for generics since these drugs are off-patent, the increase in demand is
causing the price of group E drugs to drop. Unfortunately, the model doesn’t control for increasing
disease incidence or changes in health insurance coverage so it is difficult to properly assess this
hypothesis.19
Growth in the number of DSH-340B sites was insignificant for groups A and B. Given what
we know about the negative association between off-patent drug prices and number of DSH-340B
sites (group E findings) and the positive association between on-patent drug prices and number of
DSH-340B sites (group C and group D findings), this is not terribly surprising. After all, group A and
group B include both off-patent drugs and on-patent drugs. Because the model didn’t control for
increasing demand20, the DSH-340B variable may have picked up the effect of this—i.e., the
decrease in off-patent drug prices. If this is what happened, then the impact of DSH-340B sites may
have been counterbalanced by the impact of demand and the resulting estimate for the DSH-340B
variable may have been subject to ommitted variable bias. Thus, we need to interpret the findings
regarding group A and group B drugs cautiously.
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) is associated with a very small,
delayed increase in the price of drugs in group C and D. Manufacturers may have increased prices
for the drugs in these two group in anticipation of declining revenue resulting from the PPACA’s
expansion of the 340B program. The PPACA increased the size of the 340B program by making it
possible for critical access hospitals and freestanding cancer hospitals21 that meet DSH
requirements to get 340B status.22 The PPACA’s expansion of 340B may not have affected the other

Importantly, growth in disease incidence is unlikely to impact the price of drugs in group C and group D because there
are barriers to entry since these drugs are either patent-protected or just off patent.
20 Increasing demand due to increasing disease incidence and expanded health insurance coverage.
21 Freestanding Cancer hospitals are specialty hospitals that only treat cancer patients. At present, there are only eleven
freestanding cancer hospitals in the United States, and only one of them meets the DSH requirements and has 340B status.
22 The estimated lagged impact of the PPACA is probably so small because expansion of the 340B program under the
PPACA was unlikely to significantly impact drug manufacturers’ revenue since most critical access hospitals do not
provide a large number of physician-administered drugs and there is only one freestanding cancer hospital that meets the
DSH requirements.
19
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Table 5. Regression Results for GLS Random Effects Model
Log of Real Drug
Price
Log of number of
DSH-340B entities
Patent Expiration
period
Lag 1 of patent
expiration period
Lag 2 of patent
expiration period
Lag 1 of Patient
Protection and
Affordable Care Act
Lag 2 of Patient
Protection and
Affordable Care Act
Unemployment
rate
Democratic control
of presidency and
house
Constant
Key
P<10% *
P<5% **
P<1% ***

Group A

Group B

Group C

Group D

Group E

-0.0614
(0.074)
0.3024**
(0.1218)
0.3676***
(0.1218)
0.3611**
(0.1665)
-0.1203
(0.1207)

0.0245
(0.0832)
0.2804*
(0.1507)
0.3458**
(0.1615)
0.3299*
(0.1841)
0.0025
(0.023)

0.1161***
(0.0294)
0.0525
(0.0693)
0.1071
(0.0846)
0.0224
(0.067)
0.0071
(0.0128)

0.1585***
(0.0334)
0.1163*
(0.0645)
0.1472**
(0.0688)
0.0776*
(0.0457)
0.0174*
(0.0097)

-0.3556***
(0.1313)

0.0059
(0.0421)

-0.0103
(0.0422)

0.0421***
(0.0085)

0.0591***
(0.0111)

-0.0212
(0.1080)

-0.023
(0.0198)
0.1399
(0.1377)

0.0129
(0.0092)
-0.0278
(0.0353)

-0.0028
(0.0053)
0.0306
(0.014)

-0.0031
(0.0046)
0.0283*
(0.0158)

-0.0658
(0.0537)
0.374
(0.3996)

4.6105
(0.6264)
Observations:
488
Groups: 35
R-sq
(within):
0.0526
Prob>chi2=
0.000

3.9464
(0.7551)
Observations:
388
Groups: 29
R-sq (within):
0.1160
Prob>chi2=
0.000

3.7
(0.4659)
Observations:
332
Groups: 25
R-sq (within):
0.4892
Prob>chi2=
0.000

3.074
(1.0204)
Observations:
141
Groups: 9
R-sq (within):
0.7612
Prob>chi2=
0.000

5.4697
(1.409)
Observations:
156
Groups: 10
R-sq
(within):
0.1735
Prob>chi2=
0.0444

-0.3464
(0.3386)

Table 6. Impact of 33% Growth in DSH-340B Sites on Mean Drug Price

Adalimumab
Cabazitaxel
Carboplatin
Filgrastim
Infliximab
Pegfilgrastim
Pentostatin
Trastuzumab

Drug
Group

Mean price per
unit

Price for 80KG
patient

Group C
3.6% price
increase

Group D
5.3% price
increase

C, D
C
E
D, E
C, D
C, D
E
C, D

534.26
148.82
5.16
0.88
70.47
3131.39
1527.48
79.28

$1,068.52
$7,441
$74.30
$352
$1,128
$3,131.39
$1,221.98
$3,805.44

$38.47
$267.88
$2.67
$12.67
$40.61
$112.73
$43.99
$137

$56.63
$394.37
$3.94
$18.66
$59.78
$165.96
$64.76
$201.69

/20mg
/1mg
/50mg
/1mcg
/10mg
/6mg
/10mg
/10mg
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Group E
11.9%
price
decrease
-$127.15
-$885.48
-$8.84
-$41.89
-$134.23
-$372.64
-$145.42
-$452.85

drug groups because they include off-patent drugs that may have experienced a price decrease due
to greater demand created by increasing disease incidence and expansion of insurance coverage.
The analysis also reveals that patent expiration is associated with a price increase for group
A, group B, and group D drugs. The period a drug goes off patent is associated with a 30% price
increase for group A, a 28% price increase for group B, and a 12% price increase for group D. In
addition to its association with increased price in the current time period, patent expiration
continues to be asssociated with a price increase for at least two more periods in these groups. As
noted earlier, for most drugs that went off-patent during the 9.5 year period, prices continued to
rise for three or four periods after patent expiration and only started decreasing thereafter (e.g., see
Figure 8: Capecitabine oral). The post-patent expiration price increase is likely due to two things: 1)
delayed market entry because generic manufacturers need to obtain approvals, licenses, and set up
production, and 2) the name-brand manufacturer attempting to extract as much revenue as
possible from the drug before generics enter the market. The price decline occuring several periods
after patent expiration reflects the actual entry of generics into the market. The conclusion
discusses the issue of manufacturer game-playing around patent-expiration in a bit more detail.
Having a Democratic controlled house and presidency was only significant for group D
drugs. Democratic control of these branches of government is associated with a small price
increase—about 0.02%. One explanation for this finding is that Democrats are more likely to pass
laws that attempt to cross-subsidize health care, such as expanding the scope of the 340B program,
and if these laws attempt to shift costs to drug manufacturers, they may simply shift them on to
consumers in the form of higher drug prices. While statistically significant, the coefficient on this
variable is practically insignificant.
The unemployment rate was insignificant across all drug groups. This variable was included
because greater unemployment would presumably lead to more individuals falling in the lowincome bracket, and growth in this population would mean that more hospitals would likely serve a
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large enough number of low-income patients to become eligible for DSH-340B status. One result of
growth in the number of DSH-340B sites due to unemployment, at least according to my hypothesis,
is that drug prices would go up. The analysis found no evidence that unemployment had an impact
on drug prices.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

The previous analyses show that my original hypothesis—that growth in the number of
DSH-340B sites is causing physician-administered drug prices to rise—is only partially supported
because growth in the number of DSH-340B sites was only found to be associated with a price
increase for certain types of physician-administered drugs—namely, on-patent drugs and drugs
that have not been off-patent for more than four periods.
My findings suggest that the 340B program may not actually be accomplishing the crosssubsidization it aims for. In theory, the program has pharmaceutical manufacturers subsidize care
for low-income patients by requiring them to sell drugs to 340B eligible sites at a discount. What
appears to happen, however, is that drug manufacturers simply shift the cost of the discount to
other payers by increasing the price they charge for drugs. So, individuals end up subsidizing lowincome patients’ care because their insurance premiums and the taxes they pay to support
Medicare increase in order to cover the higher drug prices. Policy makers need to keep this finding
in mind as they evaluate the impact of the 340B program and whether it is meetings its proposed
aim.
In addition, policymakers need to determine whether it matters if the 340B program is
meeting its intended goal of having drug manufacturers subsidize care for low-income patients.
After all, if the more immediate concern is to use the program to cross-subsidize care for lowincome individuals, regardless of who ends up shouldering the final cost, then the 340B program is
functioning perfectly well as it is. If, however, the program’s success is tied to having drug
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manufacturers shoulder these costs, then it appears to be failing, and policymakers should consider
pursuing other means to achieve this end.
Moving forward, there are several possibilities policymakers should consider.23 First, crosssubsidies are not uncommon in health care (e.g., commercial payers reimburse providers at a rate
substantially higher than Medicaid and Medicare to help subsidize the cost of care for Medicaid and
Medicare patients), and it could be argued that it is justified to shift some of the cost of physicianadministered drugs to individuals. This would be tantamount to letting the 340B program continue
as it is. Second, the 340B program could be revamped to ensure that 340B hospitals only receive
340B pricing for drugs administered to patients that are low-income. At present, DSH-340B
hospitals receive the reduced price on drugs for all of their patients, even if the patient is not lowincome. This sort of change would decrease the impact of the 340B program on drug
manufacturers’ revenue and would reduce their need to shift costs by increasing post-launch prices.
HRSA’s24 340B Program Omnibus Guidance sought to implement this sort of change, but it was
officially withdrawn by the Trump administration in early 2017. Third, the 340B program could be
redesigned to ensure that drug manufacturers actually shoulder the cost of the 340B program. It is
unclear how this could be achieved, but it would probably require more governmental intervention
than the current administration is likely to allow.
Another interesting finding from this project centers on the way that drug prices change
around the patent expiration period. As noted before, the analysis reveals that a drug’s price
increases at a higher rate for about three to four periods after the patent expires. One would
assume that the price would drop after patent-expiration since generics can enter the market.
However, several factors, including delay between patent-expiration and generic entry and the lag
between generic market entry and impact on name-brand price, can take some time. During this
period, manufacturers are likely trying to extract as much revenue as possible. It is also possible
23
24

All of these potential moves are widely discussed in policy and academic circles.
The Department of Health and Human Services Health Resources and Services Administration.
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that manufacturers understand that certain consumers will be brand loyal and willing to pay a
premium for the name-brand drug. So, they may be attempting to increase the price as much as
possible with the understanding that the remaining market (i.e., those that are brand-loyal) will be
less price-sensitive.25 Policymakers need to keep these findings around patent-expiration in mind
as they continue to explore how patent policy affects drug prices and the role of generics in the
drug market.
Before concluding, it is worth noting that the findings from this analysis may not generalize
to self-administered drugs. The way these drugs are paid for is slightly different and, as a result,
they may respond differently to growth in the number of DSH-340B sites. It is also possible that
the findings do not apply to low-cost physician-administered drugs. Because the sample was
largely comprised of drugs that cost over $1,000 per dose, it is unclear whether the findings will
generalize to drugs at all cost-levels.
To address these limitations, next steps in the project would likely include obtaining a
larger data set with more off-patent drugs and lower-cost physician-administered drugs. If possible,
it would also help to run a similar analysis on self-administered drugs. And finally, further analysis
should attempt to identify proxies to control for increasing disease incidence and changes in health
insurance coverage.

The topics of brand-loyalty and price sensitivity for drugs and the market conditions necessary for generics to reduce
brand-name prices have been discussed in some detail in the literature (see e.g., Conti & Berndt, 2014). Space constraints
do not allow for further discussion of these topics in this paper.
25
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Appendix A
Regression Results for Model Using Lag of DSH-340B

Υlog_of_real_drug_ASP = βlag_of_log_of_DSH_340B_entities +βpatent_expiration_period + βlag_1_of_patent_expiration_period +
βlag_2_of_patent_expiration_period + βlag_1_of_PPACA + βlag_2_of_PPACA + βunemployment + βdemocratic_control + ε
Log of Real Drug
Price
Lag of log of number
of DSH-340B entities
Patent expiration
period
Lag 1 of patent
expiration period
Lag 2 of patent
expiration period
Lag 1 of Patient
Protection and
Affordable Care Act
Lag 2 of Patient
Protection and
Affordable Care Act
Unemployment rate
Democratic control of
presidency and house
Constant
Key
P<10% *
P<5% **
P<1% ***

Group A

Group B

Group C

Group D

Group E

-0.0913
(0.0967)
0.3039**
(0.1296)
0.3793**
(0.1496)
0.3676**
(0.1762)
-0.1115
(0.1119)

0.0255
(0.0897)
0.284*
(0.1549)
0.35**
(0.1667)
0.3381*
(0.1917)
0.0011
(0.0199)

0.1215***
(0.0294)
0.0507
(0.067)
0.1034
(0.0823)
0.0207
(0.0639)
0.0017
(0.0123)

0.1669***
(0.0341)
0.1110*
(0.0627)
0.1423**
(0.067)
0.0726*
(0.0439)
0.0097
(0.0094)

-0.4332**
(0.1891)

0.0128
(0.0334)

-0.016
(0.029)

0.0189***
(0.008)

0.0277***
(0.0068)

-0.0403
(0.0948)

-0.0359
(0.0319)
0.1400
(0.1289)
4.9564
(0.9206)
Observations:
469
Groups: 35
R-sq (within):
0.0534
Prob>chi2=
0.0083

0.0147
(0.0089)
-0.0323
(0.0285)
3.928
(0.8311)
Observations:
374
Groups: 29
R-sq (within):
0.1219
Prob>chi2=
0.0001

0.004
(0.0059)
0.0113
(0.0164)
3.6225
(0.4726)
Observations:
320
Groups: 25
R-sq (within):
0.4888
Prob>chi2=
0.000

0.0063
(0.0047)
0.0025
(0.0141)
2.96
(1.0398)
Observations:
134
Groups: 9
R-sq (within):
0.7555
Prob>chi2=
0.000

-0.1095
(0.086)
0.4112
(0.3665)
6.407
(2.2008)
Observations:
149
Groups: 10
R-sq (within):
0.1698
Prob>chi2=
0.0233

-0.3133
(0.3147)

This model used the lag of log of DSH-340B sites as the independent variable of interest.
The findings are analagous to those for the model using the log of DSH-340B sites as the
independent variable (the model discussed in the results section). The key difference is that the
magnitude of the coefficients on the independent variable of interest—number of DSH-340B sites—
is slightly greater for both groups C and D and lower for group E (off-patent drugs) in this model.
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Appendix B
Regression Results for Model with Time Dummies

Υlog_of_real_drug_ASP = βlog_of_DSH_340B_entities +βpatent_expiration_period + βlag_1_of_patent_expiration_period +
βlag_2_of_patent_expiration_period + βtime_pd_3 – time_pd_19 + ε
Log of Real Drug
Price
Log of number of
DSH-340B entities
Patent expiration
period
Lag 1 of patent
expiration period
Lag 2 of patent
expiration period
Time period
dummies

Constant
Key
P<10% *
P<5% **
P<1% ***

Group A

Group B

Group C

Group D

Group E

-0.6797
(0.3716)
0.3353**
(0.1382)
0.3925***
(0.1272)
0.3825**
(0.1686)
Time period
10 and later
are
significant at
the 15% level
9.1982
(2.778)
Observations:
488
Groups: 35
R-sq
(within):
0.0762
Prob>chi2=
0.000

-0.2738
(0.1532)
0.2985*
(0.1616)
0.3642**
(0.1703)
0.347*
(0.189)
A number of
time periods
are significant
at the 10%
level
6.3038
(1.1258)
Observations:
388
Groups: 29
R-sq (within):
0.1243
Prob>chi2=
0.000

-0.2941***
(0.1118)
0.0475
(0.0741)
0.0967
(0.0918)
0.0097
(0.0769)
All time
periods
significant at
the 1% level
or better
6.833
(0.8467)
Observations:
332
Groups: 25
R-sq (within):
0.4951
Prob>chi2=
0.000

-0.3392***
(0.0948)
0.1251*
(0.0658)
0.1488*
(0.0765)
0.0757
(0.0541)
All time periods
significant at the
1% level or
better

-1.9014**
(0.9557)

3.338
(4.572)
Observations:
141
Groups: 9
R-sq (within):
0.7694
Prob>chi2= .

16.8843
(7.4655)
Observations:
156
Groups: 10
R-sq
(within):
0.2365
Prob>chi2=
0.0346

Many time
periods
significant at
the 15% level

This model includes dummies for time period 3 through time period 19. Time periods 1 and
2, the 2 lags on PPACA, the dummy variable for Democratic control, and the unemployment
variable were excluded because there was collinearity when they were included. Inclusion of these
variables did not seem necessary as the aim here was to identify significant time periods.
Log of DSH-340B is still significant for groups C , D, and E, but the direction of the
association is opposite what was found in the paper. Furthermore, for most drug groups, time
periods were statistically significant. It is important to note that there is a positive trend in both the
number of DSH-340B sites and most drug prices over the 9.5 year period. Thus, it is possible that
the time dummies were picking up the effects of each period, which included growth in DSH-340B
sites. Accordingly, each time period may be significant because the number of DSH-340B sites
increased each period. This possibility helps to explain why the estimates in this model are so
different from the estimates reported in the results section.
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Appendix C
Regression Results for Model with Time Trend Variable

Υlog_of_real_drug_ASP = βlog_of_DSH_340B_entities +βpatent_expiration_period + βlag_1_of_patent_expiration_period +
βlag_2_of_patent_expiration_period + βlag_1_of_PPACA + βlag_2_of_PPACA + βunemployment + βdemocratic_control +
βtime_trend + ε
Log of Real Drug
Price
Log of number of
DSH-340B entities
Patent expiration
period
Lag 1 of patent
expiration period
Lag 2 of patent
expiration period
Lag 1 of Patient
Protection and
Affordable Care Act
Lag 2 of Patient
Protection and
Affordable Care Act
Unemployment
rate
Democratic control
of presidency and
house
Time trend
Constant
Key
P<10% *
P<5% **
P<1% ***

Group A

Group B

Group C

Group D

Group E

0.1190
(0.1473)
0.3077**
(0.1216)
0.3751***
(0.1213)
0.3706**
(0.1633)
-0.0952
(0.1068)

0.1436
(0.1151)
0.2841*
(0.1513)
0.3521**
(0.1619)
0.3364*
(0.1832)
0.019
(0.0257)

0.0482
(0.0504)
0.0471
(0.0714)
0.0981
(0.0881)
0.0104
(0.0734)
-0.0025
(0.012)

0.0909
(0.0933)
0.114*
(0.0638)
0.1412**
(0.0686)
0.0757*
(0.0439)
0.0077
(0.013)

0.259
(0.549)

0.0606
(0.0685)

0.0258
(0.0365)

0.0216*
(0.0111)

0.0393*
(0.0239)

0.163
(0.2014)

-0.0192
(0.0188)
0.1529
(0.1448)

0.0154
(0.0107)
-0.0192
(0.0310)

-0.0043
(0.0055)
0.0261*
(0.0141)

-0.0049
(0.0059)
0.0245
(0.016)

-0.0514
(0.0526)
0.4148
(0.4181)

-0.0233
(0.0186)
3.287
(1.122)
Observations:
488
Groups: 35
R-sq
(within):
0.0538
Prob>chi2=
0.000

-0.0154
(0.0138)
3.074
(1.0017)
Observations:
388
Groups: 29
R-sq (within):
0.1176
Prob>chi2=
0.000

0.0088
(0.0064)
4.197
(0.579)
Observations:
332
Groups: 25
R-sq (within):
0.4911
Prob>chi2=
0.000

0.0088
(0.0129)
3.572
(1.327)
Observations:
141
Groups: 9
R-sq (within):
0.7624
Prob>chi2=
0.000

-0.0792
(0.0657)
0.945
(4.184)
Observations:
156
Groups: 10
R-sq
(within):
0.1784
Prob>chi2=
0.0346

-0.26
(0.3025)

This model included a time trend variable to control for unknown factors that may impact
drug prices. The time trend variable includes all time periods (time_trend=1 if time_pd==1,
time_trend=2 if time_pd==2, . . . time_trend==19 if time_pd==19). Inclusion of the time trend
washed out the significance of DSH-340B sites. This is probably because there is an upward trend
in the number of DSH-340B sites and the time trend variable picked this up.
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Appendix D
Regression Results Using Lag of Drug Price

Υlog_of_real_drug_ASP = βlog_of_DSH_340B_entities + βlag_1_log_of_real_drug_ASP + ε
Log of Real
Drug Price
Log of number of
DSH-340B entities
Lag of log of real
drug price
Constant
Key
P<10% *
P<5% **
P<1% ***

Group A

Group B

Group C

Group D

Group E

0.007
(0.0078)
0.9909***
(0.0155)
-0.0269
(0.0889)
Observations:
466
Groups: 34
R-sq
(within):
0.0848
Prob>chi2=
0.000

-0.0056
(0.0064)
1.0048***
(0.003)
0.0331
(0.0493)
Observations:
370
Groups: 28
R-sq (within):
0.9410
Prob>chi2=
0.000

0.0042*
(0.0024)
1.0012***
(0.0022)
-0.0317
(0.0233)
Observations:
316
Groups: 24
R-sq (within):
0.9278
Prob>chi2=
0.000

0.0052
(0.0045)
1.0037***
(0.003)
-0.047
(0.0451)
Observations:
138
Groups: 9
R-sq (within):
0.9742
Prob>chi2=
0.000

0.0183
(0.0289)
0.9462***
(0.0662)
-0.1022
(0.2809)
Observations:
150
Groups: 10
R-sq
(within):
0.0608
Prob>chi2=
0.0000

A lag of the log of the real drug price was added to the base model to construct a time series
model. The lag dependent variable was strongly predictive of the log of drug prices for every group
indicating trends in drug prices. DSH-340B is statistically significant for group C, though the impact
is miniscule (0.004% increase in real price per 1% growth in DSH-340B sites).
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